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A floating exchange rate combined with a clear inflation target can be a powerful 
stabilizer even if there are fluctuations in exchange rates that are unrelated to current 
fundamentals,.  Under plausible conditions, most of the stabilisation will occur through 
the exchange rate, and fundamental shocks will generate considerable medium term 
exchange rate volatility.  The consequences of asymmetric shocks inside EMU are worse 
than envisaged in early analyses of the EMU project such as Calmfors et al. (1997).  
Inflation and real interest rate differentials arise which magnify the imbalances and cause 
boom-bust cycles in the member countries.     
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1.  Introduction 
Sweden recently voted no to the euro, but several other countries are facing the choice 
whether to join EMU in the near future.  The traditional starting point for analysis of EMU is 
the theory of optimal currency areas.  According to this scheme of analysis, membership in a 
monetary union brings efficiency gains on the microeconomic level, but macroeconomic costs 
associated with the loss of monetary autonomy.  When you cannot pursue a monetary policy 
which is appropriate for the specific country, macroeconomic stability is harder to maintain. 
This trade-off between microeconomic gains and macroeconomic losses is often 
questioned by economists who argue that the value of monetary autonomy is exaggerated in 
the conventional analysis.  Sometimes it is even claimed that the macroeconomic arguments 
might be in favour of monetary union.  The reason why one can come to such a conclusion is 
exchange rate volatility.  In the conventional Mundell-Fleming model, exchange rates respond 
to fundamental shocks in such a way that they help to stabilize output and inflation.  But in 
reality, exchange rates are very volatile and the uncovered interest parity condition - a key 
ingredient in conventional macroeconomic models - fails miserably in econometric 
estimation.  With excessive and irrational volatility, a flexible exchange rate may be a source 
of instability rather than a shock absorber, it is said.   
Another argument is that the central banks of small countries with floating rates 
and supposedly independent monetary policies often move their interest rates in line with 
their big neighbours.  What is the value of an independent monetary policy if, much of the 
time, you set the same interest rate? 
In this paper I use a simple model of the Mundell-Fleming type to make three 
arguments.  First, a model of this type is consistent with the broad stylized facts of 
international macroeconomics.  With imperfect competition in goods markets, non-clearing 
and non-integrated labour markets, nominal wage rigidity, persistent supply and demand 
shocks, and some noise in exchange rates, we should expect the high volatility of real and 
nominal exchange rates and the failure of uncovered interest parity that we observe in the 
data.   3
Second, even if there are substantial movements in exchange rates that are 
unrelated to current fundamentals, a flexible exchange rate coupled with a clear inflation 
target can be a very powerful stabiliser.  Under plausible conditions, most of the stabilisation 
will occur through the exchange rate rather than the interest rate, so small interest rate 
differentials do not imply that there is little stabilization. 
Third, the consequences of asymmetric shocks in EMU are worse than 
envisaged in early analyses of the EMU project such as Calmfors et al. (1997).  Asymmetric 
shocks, which are not counteracted by fiscal policy, will lead to inflation differentials and real 
interest rate differentials between the countries, which magnify the imbalances.  The result is 
boom-bust cycles in the member countries.  Persistency of supply and demand shocks adds to 
the problem and the key factor that makes this a more serious problem in Europe compared to 
the US is the low labour mobility between European countries.   
Inspiration to this paper comes partly from Bergvall (2002a) who examines the 
stabilizing role of alternative exchange rate systems, and  the recent papers by Honohan and 
Lane (2003) on inflation differentials in EMU and Sinn (2003) on the current problems in 
Germany. 
In the next section I present the theoretical framework that is used in the 
analysis.  In Section 3 I consider the situation outside the monetary union with a floating 
exchange rate and inflation targeting.  Two extreme cases are considered, first when demand 
and supply shocks are temporary, then the more realistic case when shocks are very persistent.  
In Section 4 I analyse what happens when the small country joins a large monetary union.  A 
theoretical and empirical comparison of the situations inside and outside EMU is made in 
Section 5 and the role of fiscal federalism and labour and product market integration are 
discussed in Section 6.  Section 7 concludes. 
 
2.  A Mundell-Fleming Model 
The perspective taken here is that of a small open economy considering whether to join a 
large monetary union.  Trade with countries outside the monetary union is disregarded in the 
formal analysis.  Since the focus is on asymmetric shocks creating imbalances in the small   4
country, variables relating to the monetary union are taken to be constant.
1  The theoretical 
framework is a simple Mundell-Fleming model, intended to be relevant for the medium term, 
say 1-6 years.  To make the arguments as clear as possible, the model is kept simple 
(disregarding lags etc.) and the period in the model should be thought of as one or two years.   
Credit markets are assumed to be perfectly integrated and the uncovered interest 
parity condition is a key equation in the model.
2  Labour is assumed to be immobile so there 
are completely separate labour markets.  Product markets are characterised by imperfect 
competition and purchasing power parity (PPP) does not hold.  One reason is that goods are 
differentiated so that prices of goods produced in different countries can deviate from each 
other.  But even if the goods are similar, imperfect information implies imperfect competition 
and deviations from the law of one price.  A key insight from search models of the product 
market is that imperfect information makes a market, which would otherwise be perfectly 
competitive, similar to monopolistic competition.   
Customer relations are another reason why the medium term price elasticity of 
exports and imports is modest.  When customers respond slowly to changes in costs and 
prices, relative prices can deviate for substantial periods before there are major effects on 
market shares.
3 On the empirical level, it has long been well known that there are substantial 
and persistent deviations from the law of one price even for similar traded goods - see 
references in Gottfries (1986) and Rogoff (1996).
4 
The model includes an IS-curve (1), an interest parity condition (2), a Phillips 
curve/aggregate supply relation (3), an expectations scheme (4), and autoregressive shock 
processes (5)-(7): 
 
() ( ) t
e
t t t t t d i p p e y + − − − + = +1 * π γ β      (1) 
                                                 
1 We can think of the small country variables as denoting deviations from the mean in the monetary union. 
2 Trade in state-contingent assets is not allowed. 
3 See Gottfries (1986, 1991, 2002), Froot and Klemperer (1989), Klemperer (1995). I do not allow for explicit j-
curve effects in the formal model.  Yet another reason why relative price changes are necessary occurs if there 
are some fixed factors of production (knowledge etc.) in the tradable sector, so an improvement in 
competitiveness (unit labour cost) is necessary in order for exports to increase (see Bergvall 2002b). 
4 If shocks shocks are persistent but not permanent, PPP holds in the long run in the model.  Structural 
differences in inflation due to the Balassa-Samuelson effect are disregarded.  Honohan and Lane (2003) 
conclude that “the Balassa-Samuelsson growth effect has not yet played an important role”.   5
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i is the nominal interest rate in the small country and i* is the interest rate in the monetary 
union.  All other variables are in logs; y is production, p is the price of nontradable goods, 
π is inflation() 1 − − t t p p , 
e π is expected inflation, e is the nominal exchange rate (the price of 
the currency of the monetary union), p* is the price level in the monetary union, and  y  is the 
natural level of output.
5   
Some microeconomic foundations for wage and price setting and the effect of 
the real exchange rate on aggregate demand are given in the appendix.  Full dynamic 
optimization on the demand side would imply that national wealth (net claims on foreigners) 
would become a state variable and I would have to resort to numerical simulation to solve the 
model.  To keep the model analytically solvable, I simply assume that real spending is a 
function of a demand shock, dt, and the expected real interest rate.   
  I use a simple backward looking specification of expectations (4) where 
0 π  is 
the inflation target, which is also the average level of inflation.  This specification may be 
                                                 
5 The monetary union is large relative to the home country and the prices of tradable and nontradable goods are 
the same in the monetary union.   6
criticized for lacking microeconomic underpinnings but the question how to model inflation 
expectations is a matter of intense research and controversy and there is considerable evidence 
of a “backward-looking” element in the inflation process (see e. g. Mankiw 2001).  This so-
called “inflation persistence” problem is dealt with in various ways in the literature on 
monetary policy.  Some authors introduce “rule of thumb” price-setters, Mankiw and Reis 
(2002) formulate a model where individuals update their information only occasionally, and 
Ball (2000) considers a model where individuals use optimal univariate forecasts for inflation.  
To keep the model simple, I postulate the backward-looking expectations scheme (4) with 
λ as a measure of inflation persistence.   
The demand shock, d, represents “animal spirits”, pension reforms, and other 
factors affecting aggregate demand.  The aggregate supply shock is a shock to the natural 
level output caused by changes in technology, labour supply, or structural changes in the 
labour market.
6  All shocks are allowed to be autoregressive.  For notational convenience, the 
autoregressive parameter is assumed to be the same for the demand and the supply shock.   
The shock to the interest parity condition, u, can represent irrational movements 
in the exchange rate due to bubbles, noise traders etc. but it could also reflect completely 
rational variations in confidence.  If, for some reason, there is increased uncertainty 
concerning future monetary and fiscal policy, international investors will require a higher risk 
premium when lending to the country.   The result will be either a higher interest rate or a 
depreciated exchange rate.
7  In the following, I use the term “confidence shock” for this 
shock.   
Note that if the exchange rate is expected to be unchanged and there is no 
confidence shock the interest rate will be the same as abroad and the real exchange rate, 
which is consistent with output being at its natural level, is: 
                                                 
6 Standard supply side shocks (technology, labour supply etc.) are shocks to potential output.  Oil price increases 
and tax changes may affect the price level without much effect on potential output.  Such shocks are disregarded 
here.  Central banks often allow such factors to cause temporary deviations of inflation from the target; 
sometimes they use price indices which exclude them. 
7 Formally we can imagine that a shift to a more inflationary monetary policy regime occurs with some small 
probability and that investors estimate this probability based on political variables outside the model.  Then we 
will see variations in the risk premium even if there is no actual change of regime in the sample period.  Such a 
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When shocks occur, relative price changes are necessary in order to maintain macroeconomic 
balance and the magnitude of the necessary adjustment of the real exchange rate depends on 
the parameter β .  In order to get an idea how large β  may be we have to consider the effect 
of the real exchange rate on imports and exports.  The price elasticity of imports is relatively 
low.  First, many imported goods are not produced in the home country.  Cars are not 
produced in Denmark, Norway or Finland, and bananas are not produced in Sweden.  For 
such goods, import demand is simply market demand for the product.  If, for example, 
consumers have Cobb-Douglas preferences the price elasticity of import demand will be unity 
and the share of nominal expenditure spent on imported goods will be constant.  In cases 
when there are domestic producers, customer relations and supply constraints limit medium 
term changes in their market shares.  If domestic producers have a relatively small share of 
the market, the price elasticity of imports will still be close to the price elasticity of market 
demand.  In fact, the price elasticity of import demand is often found to be around to unity in 
empirical studies (Goldstein and Kahn 1985).   
On the export side, we would expect a larger elasticity.
8  But as discussed above, 
product differentiation and customer relations limit the price elasticity over the medium term.  
Conventional estimates of the medium term price elasticity of exports are around 1.5-2 but 
they are likely to suffer from downward bias as discussed in Gottfries (2002).  We must also 
take account of the fact that there is less than full pass-through (pricing to market) so only a 
fraction of a change in the real exchange rate (measured in terms of nontradables or unit 
labour costs) feeds through into the relative price of tradables.
9   
                                                 
8 Suppose, for example, that domestic producers have a market share of 10 percent in the domestic and foreign 
markets and as a result of depreciation of the home currency their market share increases 20 percent, to 12 
percent.  For given market demand at home and abroad, exports will increase 20 percent and imports will 
decrease 2.2 percent.  
9  For Swedish and international evidence, see Lundin (2003).   8
In the appendix I formulate a simple model with imperfect competition and 





PV XP Ε Ε − = β .   (9) 
 
XP Ε is the price elasticity of exports,  PV Ε is the elasticity of the export price with respect to 
variable cost, and X/Y is exports relative to GDP.  In previous work I found that  3 − ≈ ΕXP  
and 4 . 0 ≈ ΕPV  for Sweden (Gottfries (2002)).  Since the export share is about one quarter in 
value added terms (excluding the import content in exports) we get 
30 . 0 25 . 0 4 . 0 3 = × × = β .
10  Thus, if   domestic demand falls by an amount corresponding to 5 
percent of GDP, a real depreciation in the order of 17 percent (5/.30) is required in order to 
maintain output at its natural level.  If, instead, we consider a large country such as the US 
with an export share around 10 percent we get a lower value for β , so larger real exchange 
rate movements are necessary in order to maintain macroeconomic balance.   
 
3.  Floating Exchange Rate and Inflation Target 
Now consider the situation outside the monetary union.  I assume that the objective of the 
central bank is low average inflation and output close to the natural (flex price) level.  The 
central bank has no desire to counteract changes in output caused by changes in technology or 
labour supply and it does not care about changes in the consumer price index associated with 
necessary relative price adjustments.  To achieve its objective, the central bank adopts an 
inflation target 
0 π  in terms of the price of nontradable goods.
11  Since the price level in the 
monetary union is assumed to be constant, 
0 π  may be thought of as the difference between 
                                                 
10 This number for β  is in the range found in empirical work with aggregate data.  Bergvall (2002a) estimates 
the effect of the real exchange rate on aggregate demand and finds elasticities in the range 0.2-0.5.   
11  One may object that most central banks formulate an objective in terms of the consumer price index.  The 
practical difference should not be very large, however, because the medium term impact of the exchange rate on 
the consumer price level seems to be small.     9
the inflation target in the home country and that in the monetary union.  The instrument of 
monetary policy is the interest rate. 
  I focus on a situation when monetary policy outside the monetary union has the 
same average level of credibility as monetary policy inside.
12  To keep the model simple, I 
assume that the central bank can observe the shocks and react to them, and thus keep actual 
inflation equal to the target 
0 π π = t  in every period.  In such a regime, equation (4) implies 
that 
0 π π =
e
t  and (3) implies: 
       
()
0 0 π α π π = − + = t t t y y .     (10) 
 
Inflation targeting implies that production is kept at its natural level t t y y = .  Substituting the 
aggregate demand relation (1) we get  
 
( ) () t t t t t t y d p p e i i − = − + − − *
0 β π γ .     (11) 
 
The left hand side is a linear combination of the real interest rate and the real exchange rate 
and may be thought of as a monetary conditions index.
13  This monetary conditions index is 
set in such a way as to balance supply and demand shocks.  In order to solve for the exchange 
rate, use (11) to substitute for it in the interest parity condition (2) and  t t t p p π + = −1 : 
 
                                                 
12  As discussed above, confidence shocks may be interpreted as temporary fluctuations in credibility.  It is very 
hard to see why credibility should be an argument for forming monetary unions, at least if the union involves 
countries on a similar level of development.  If country A has a more credible monetary policy than country B it 
must be because country A has a better institutional framework for monetary policy (a more independent central 
bank, a clearer goal for monetary policy etc.).  Then it makes more sense for country B to copy the monetary 
policy framework of country A than to give up monetary policy in order to get a credible regime.  For this 
reason, Calmfors et al. (1997) saw little reason why there would be a long run credibility gain – and lower 
interest rates - if Sweden joined the EMU.  Still, the credibility argument and the associated interest rate 
differential have remained popular in the debate over the costs and benefits of joining the EMU.   
13 See Ball (1999) for an open economy model where the policy rule can b expressed in terms of a monetary 
conditions index.   10








To find the solution for the exchange rate, I guess that the solution has the form: 
 
() t t t t t Cu y d B A p p e + − + + − = − * 1      (13) 
 
where A, B and C are unknown coefficients.  Then the expected future exchange rate is 
 
() ( ) t u t t y t t t u C y d B A p p e E ρ ρ + − + + − = + * 1    (14) 
 
and the expected change in the exchange rate is 
 
() ( )( ) ( ) t u t t y t t u C y d B e E 1 1
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The implications of the model depend very much on the degree of persistence of the shocks.  
In order to clarify this, it is useful to examine two extreme cases: when shocks are completely 
transitory and when they are very persistent. 
 
Temporary Shocks 
If all shocks are completely temporary  0 = = u y ρ ρ  and 
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where I used the fact that 
0
1 π + = − t t p p .  When there is a positive (net) demand shock, the 
central bank raises the interest rate, and the currency appreciates; the two effects are of equal 
magnitude and both help to maintain stable production.  A confidence shock (positive u) 
implies a depreciation of the exchange rate but the central bank compensates for this by 
raising the interest rate so that output is kept stable.  In spite of the noise that is present in the 
exchange rate, monetary policy is able to maintain macroeconomic stability. 
In practice, though, one may argue that the case for maintaining an independent 
monetary policy is much weaker than it appears in this simple model.  Monetary policy 
affects the economy with a lag. Empirical studies typically find that it takes about a year for   12
the full effect on output to occur.
14  If shocks are temporary, there is a considerable risk that 
the effects of policy arise after the shock has disappeared.  This is a reason to be sceptical 
about the usefulness of an independent monetary policy.   
  Furthermore, confidence shocks may create considerable imbalances between 
different sectors even if overall macroeconomic balance is maintained.  If the currency 
depreciates due to lack of confidence this creates large profits in the tradable sector while, at 
the same time, the high interest rate leads to contraction of domestic sectors such as 
construction.   
  In the light of equations (21) and (22), tests of the UIP condition may be taken 
as confirmation that most movements in the exchange rates are unrelated to fundamentals.  
According to the model, fundamental supply and demand shocks imply that the interest rate is 
high when the currency is strong and expected to depreciate.  Confidence shocks have the 
opposite effect: the interest rate is high when the currency is temporarily depreciated and thus 
expected to appreciate.  In fact, many studies have found the “wrong” sign of the coefficient 
for the interest rate when testing UIP; in practice, a high interest rate is a sign that the 
currency will appreciate rather than depreciate.
15 
Thus, we are lead to conclude that most movements in exchange rates are due to 
confidence shocks and only a small share is due to fundamentals.  Confidence shocks are a 
nuisance for monetary policy as well as for firms trading in international markets and a major 
advantage of joining a monetary union is that irrational movements in exchange rates are 
eliminated.  The case for joining a monetary union appears to be strong.   
But this reasoning is based on the assumption that shocks are temporary.  The 
conclusions will be quite different if we take shocks to be very persistent and this case is 
examined below.   
 
                                                 
14  The most convincing evidence of such a lag comes from estimated VAR models where innovations in the 
policy instrument (money, monetary base or the interest rate) are interpreted as exogenous policy shocks.  An 
early study along these lines was Blanchard (1989); for a recent overview, see Christiano-Eichenbaum-Evans 
(1999). 
15 These tests typically consist of estimating regressions of the type  ( ) 1
*
1 + + − + = − + t t i t i t e t e ε β α  and testing 
whether β  is equal to unity.   13
Persistent Shocks 
The business cycle is not a sinus curve which automatically returns to the mean after a given 
time.  As emphasised by Romer (2001), business cycles vary considerably in size and length.   
In fact, many macroeconomic variables appear to be non-stationary but stationary in 
differences.  This is an important insight from the last 20 years of empirical research on 
macroeconomic time series.  Often, it is hard to say whether variables are really non-
stationary or stationary around some deterministic trend, but if there is reversion to the mean 
it is often so slow that one cannot reject non-stationarity.  This applies to production but also 
to consumption, real and nominal exchange rates, and many other variables.
16  Since observed 
variables are ultimately driven by supply and demand shocks it seems plausible to think of the 
underlying supply and demand shocks as also being very persistent.
17   
If we think of what lies behind supply and demand shocks, a high degree of 
persistence also seems plausible.  One intended effect of a pension reform would typically be 
to increase the national savings rate and this necessarily translates to a persistent decrease in 
domestic demand.  On the supply side, a structural change in the labour market will affect the 
natural rates of employment and output; again we would expect this change to be very 
persistent.   
Countries do not export the same goods and exogenous changes in terms of 
trade in the world market may also be included in the demand shock.  If we had included 
countries outside the monetary union and allowed for differences in the exposure to exchange 
rates and demand from countries outside the monetary union, we would have had another 
source of shocks to aggregate demand.
18  In both cases, data tells us that the shocks tend to be 
quite persistent. 
We may also consider less fundamental reasons behind demand and supply 
shocks.  There appear to be large swings in consumption and investment associated with 
moods and “animal spirits”.  In some periods there is a lot of optimism and when some firms 
                                                 
16 For example, Alexius and Nilsson reject stationarity of the real exchange rate (long run PPP) for 11 out of 13 
OECD countries. 
17 In fact, this is the idea in “common trends” models which take observed variables as being linear functions of 
unobserved common trends. 
18 This reason for imbalances is emphasised by Honohan and Lane (2003).     14
and consumers spend they generate business and increased optimism for other firms and 
consumers.  When firms go bankrupt they bring other firms and financial institutions with 
them.  Thus there are reinforcing factors, which amplify booms and recessions, and it seems 
plausible that these processes can go on for some time if they are not halted by fiscal or 
monetary policy. 
Thus it seems much more plausible that  y ρ  is close to unity than that it is close 
to zero.  To highlight the role of persistence, consider the limit case when  1 → y ρ .
19  Then 
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If the inflation target is the same as the inflation rate in the monetary union ( ) 0
0 = π  and there 
are no confidence shocks, changes in the nominal exchange rate are unpredictable, the 
nominal and the real exchange rate are random walks, and they are perfectly correlated.  In a 
Keynesian world with much volatility in demand and little volatility in supply we will observe 
considerable exchange rate volatility, but little variation in inflation and output.
20   As 
discussed in Section 2, a plausible value of β  implies that there will be considerable variation 
in the real and nominal exchange rate. 
                                                 
19 Formally, demand and supply cannot be independent random walks but variations in national savings rates can 
be very persistent.  I look at the case when  1 = ρ  only to highlight the role of persistence. 
20 If we add a conventional money demand equation we may note that the interest rate is constant and thus the 
real money supply will be proportional to output.    15
If we add confidence shocks we can explain the perverse results sometimes 
obtained in tests of the UIP relation.  As before, the central bank will react to lack of 
confidence by increasing the interest rate and this will generate a negative correlation between 
the interest rate differential and the expected appreciation of the exchange rate.
21 
Alexius (2001) and Meredith and Chinn (1998) find that the uncovered interest 
parity hypothesis fairs better when tested for long-term financial investments.  Typically the 
coefficient for the interest rate differential gets the right sign, but it is smaller than unity.  This 
is exactly what we would expect if demand and supply shocks are more persistent than 
confidence shocks. 
  With highly persistent demand and supply shocks, the above model is consistent 
with the observed high volatility, unpredictability, and persistence of nominal and real 
exchange rates, and the close correlation between them.  Also, it is consistent with substantial 
deviations from the “law of one price” for tradable goods and the observation that prices of 
different goods inside a country are more correlated than prices of similar goods sold in 
different countries (Engel and Rogers 1996).   
An interesting observation is that when shocks are very persistent, stabilisation 
of real shocks occurs primarily via the exchange rate; the interest rate is used mainly to 
counteract what is seen as irrational or excessive exchange rate movements.   
With persistent shocks and some variation in confidence, the model is consistent 
with major stylized facts in international macroeconomics.  It also implies that a flexible 
exchange rate and a clear inflation target help to maintain macroeconomic stability.  Lags in 
the implementation and effects of policy have been disregarded, but if shocks are highly 
persistent this is much less of a problem.  Then policy will be useful even if the effect takes 
some time.   
                                                 
21 This argument has some similarity with that of McCallum (1994) in that the central bank reacts to shocks to 
the UIP relation, but his model is different and based on interest rate smoothing.  Fama (1984) pointed out that a 
small or negative coefficient in test of UIP means that the variance of the “risk premium” is larger than the 
variance of the expected change in the exchange rate.  When exchange rate changes are (almost) unpredictable, 
this condition is easy to satisfy (see discussion in Alexius (2002)).   16
But to see exactly the value of having an independent monetary policy we must 
compare to the situation when the small country joins the large monetary union and this is the 
topic of the next section. 
 
4.  Membership in the Monetary Union 
The common currency simplifies for business trading with other countries in the union.  Firms 
can avoid costs for exchanging currencies and uncertainty about the value of the euro relative 
to the home currency.  Thus one should expect a positive effect on trade with other members 
of the monetary union.  Early studies point to increases in trade in the order of 10 percent due 
to EMU (Micco, Stein and Ordonez (2003), Flam and Nordström (2003)).  For a small open 
economy such as Sweden, this would imply that exports and imports, which today constitute 
about 40 percent of  GDP, would increase by an amount corresponding to 4 percent of GDP.  
Increased exchange of goods and services would bring gains from increased specialization, 
economies of scale etc.   More trade and increased comparability of prices should induce 
some equalisation of prices in some markets. 
  But a Volvo is not the same thing as a BMW even if they are both purchased 
with euros.  Customer relations and established networks are important in many markets and 
this will not change because we use euros.  There will be some increase in trade and 
competition along the borders etc. but price differences caused by differences in productivity, 
wages and taxes will not disappear because of the common currency. 
   Calmfors and Johansson (2002) have argued that nominal wage flexibility 
should increase when a country joins a monetary union.  But nominal wage rigidity seems to 
be pervasive in developed countries with low inflation rates, so we should expect considerable 
nominal rigidity to remain. 
Thus I will use the same model to analyse what happens when the small country 
joins the monetary union, but we can think of the parameter values as being somewhat 
different.  When the country is inside the monetary union  0 = t e  and  * i it = , and average 
inflation is assumed to be zero 
   17
() ( ) [] t t t t t t y p p i d − − + − − + = − * * 1 β λπ γ α λπ π .   (26) 
 
Using the fact that  t t t p p π + = −1  we can solve for the inflation rate: 
 
() () 1 1 1 1 1 1
* *



















π   (27) 
 
If shocks to demand and supply are temporary  0 = y ρ and there is no inflation persistence 
0 = λ  we will have some temporary variations in output and inflation.  As discussed above, it 
is not clear that those variations could be effectively countered by monetary policy outside the 
monetary union.  But in the case of persistent shocks we get prolonged periods with high or 
low inflation relative to the average in the monetary union.  Inflation persistence () λ  
magnifies the imbalances arising from asymmetric shocks.  The real interest rate becomes low 
in an inflationary boom and high in a deflationary recession.
22  But periods of high inflation 
will not last forever; when prices have increased enough, the process is reversed because the 
export industry loses market shares.  The result is boom-bust cycles with periods of high and 
low inflation.     
In the previous section I argued that high persistence of demand and supply 
shocks is plausible, consistent with the facts, and helps to resolve the UIP puzzle.  Such 
persistence also adds to the severity of the problems in the monetary union.  As discussed in 
Section 2, real exchange rate adjustments are necessary when there are persistent changes in 
demand and supply, and in a monetary union these adjustments can only occur via inflation 
differentials.  In fact, inflation differentials are the adjustment mechanism in a monetary 
union, but with inflation persistence we are likely to get overshooting, with booms followed 
by busts, and conversely. 
 
 
                                                 
22 This mechanism was pointed out by Walters (1986) in the case of fixed exchange rates and is discussed by 
Svensson (1994) in the context of the ERM crisis.   18
5.  Comparing stability inside and outside 
The most important prediction of the analysis is that there will be larger deviations from the 
natural level of output inside the monetary union.  Outside, shocks are stabilised; inside the 
imbalances are amplified by the common monetary policy.  Year to year volatility of output 
need not be larger, but there will be long periods during which output is above or below the 
natural level.  As a consequence, there will be persistent inflation differentials within the 
monetary union.  
Obviously, the model presented here is very simplified.  By allowing the central 
bank to respond to all shocks it gives an exaggerated picture of the potency of monetary 
outside the monetary union.  But the main conclusion should be quite robust theoretically.  
Even if we would introduce some unobservable shocks and control errors - the qualitative 
conclusion will be the same as long as the central bank can respond to some shocks.  When 
real shocks are very persistent it seems plausible that the central bank does have ability to 
counteract them.   
One case when the conclusion may be overturned is if there are substantial 
confidence shocks (ut) and the central bank is unable to counteract them.  Obviously, day to 
day volatility in the exchange rate cannot be counteracted by monetary policy, but such 
volatility can hardly threaten macroeconomic balance either.  But the central bank should be 
able to detect longer term mispricing of the exchange rate, which threatens macroeconomic 
stability.
23 
A backward-looking Phillips curve was assumed because of its simplicity and 
apparent consistency with observed inflation persistence.  But the main mechanism does not 
rely on inflation persistence.  With forward-looking pricing à la Taylor-Calvo, it will still be 
the case that periods of high demand will be associated with high inflation and low real 
interest rates in the monetary union.  The main difference is that inflation would stop 
immediately when the boom ends, so the problems would be less severe. 
We now have data for the first four years of monetary union in Europe and we 
may ask whether the outcome so far supports or contradicts the analysis.  The main difficulty 
                                                 
23   In a more elaborate model, Nyberg (2003) shows that the central bank should care more about the exchange 
rate the more persistent confidence shocks may be.     19
that we face when we try to test the main prediction is the problem of measuring the natural 
level of output.  With persistent shocks that affect the natural level of output, and persistent 
deviations from the natural level inside the union, trend extrapolations will be a crude 
measure of potential output.  Estimates of the natural rate of unemployment are notoriously 
unreliable.
24 
In view of this measurement problem it may be more useful to look at inflation.  
First, price stability is a policy objective in itself, and second, variations in inflation are an 
indication that output is, or has been, deviating from the natural level (c. f. equation (3)).  
What is problematic according to my analysis is persistent deviations in inflation from target.  
For this reason I have calculated average inflation rates during the first four years of EMU for 
the euro countries and five countries with floating exchange rates and explicit inflation 
targeting (Table 1).  I use two measures of inflation: the consumer price index and the GDP 
deflator.  The consumer price index is relevant for consumers but the GDP deflator is more 
relevant for domestic producers.  As an indication of domestic imbalance (see equation (3)) 
prices of domestic production may be more relevant than consumer prices, which are affected 
by indirect taxes, oil prices, exchange rates, and import prices.   
We see immediately that inflation differs more between countries inside the 
EMU, particularly if we measure inflation using the GDP deflator.  By this measure, the 
difference between the highest and lowest inflation in EMU is 4.2 percent; the corresponding 
difference for the inflation targeting countries is 1.4.  As a consequence, real interest rates 
differed from 3 percent for Germany to minus one for Ireland.   
  Two countries appear to have been particularly affected by the common 
monetary policy in this period: Ireland and Germany.  Some key data or these countries are 
shown in Table 2. 
As Ireland joined the monetary union, the interest rate was cut from 6 to 3 
percent and this, together with a sinking euro, fuelled the boom that was already underway.  
                                                 
24  From 1995 to 2003 wages in Germany grew on average 1.5 percent annually, inflation (GDP deflator) was 0.9 
percent, average GDP growth was 1.3 percent, and unemployment was high.  With downward nominal wage 
rigidity as in Holden (1994, 2003) and Akerlof-Dickens-Perry (1996) it is possible that the German economy has 
been on the flat part of the long run Phillips curve for a long time.  In such a situation, data for actual output 
contains very little information about potential output.   20
In the first five years 1999-2002, Ireland has had 7 percent wage increase per year and 4.5 
percent inflation compared to 2 percent wage and price increases for the euro area.  The real 
interest rate has been negative 5 of the last 6 years and property prices have soared.  
In Germany, the downturn that started in 2001 has been magnified by a too high 
interest rate and a rising euro.  As Germany went into a crisis, the euro rose some 20 percent 
against the dollar.  The European Central Bank is not cutting its interest rate much because 
some other countries, such as Ireland, have relatively high inflation.  Germany has a number 
of specific problems, including those in former East Germany, but the situation is not made 
better by having a too high interest rate.  Wage growth and inflation have been very low in 
Germany so there was ample room for expansionary demand management, but expansionary 
monetary policy has not been possible because Germany has lost control over monetary 
policy.   
  These imbalances have not gone unnoticed.  Economists watching developments 
in the euro area have noticed them (Gaynor et. al. 2002).  Honohan and Lane (2003) describe 
the imbalances in Ireland: 
  “What went wrong for Ireland and is it a harbinger of the likely prospects for the accession 
countries?  We argue that, in addition to domestic factors, EMU itself has contributed to the 
surge in Irish inflation.  EMU did remove a potentially effective instrument of policy restraint 
(nominal exchange rate adjustment).  Furthermore, by lowering nominal and real interest 
rates, EMU added an important demand fillip, especially manifested in soaring house prices.  
And the inflationary impulse, exceptionally strong for Ireland, that was generated by euro 
weakness in the early years of the system might well have bee offset by an appreciation of the 
Irish pound within the wide EMS band that was in effect from 1993-1998.”   
and Sinn (2003) writes about Germany:   
”…  the euro is causing adjustment problems for Germany and is constraining Germany’s 
economic policy.  This situation shows surprising parallels with that of Japan.” 
These statements are not statements against the euro, but observation what has happened in 
Ireland and Germany.   
The Taylor rule is a well known rule of thumb for monetary policy.  It says that 
the interest rate should depend on inflation and the output gap and a key element in the Taylor   21
rule is that the coefficient on inflation should be substantially larger than unity.  The intuition 
is that if inflation has increased, it is likely inflation expectations have also increased.  In 
order to get a contraction of aggregate demand, the nominal interest rate must rise more than 
inflation so that the expected real interest rate increases.   
The coefficient for inflation in the Taylor Rule is typically set between 1.5 and 
2.5.  Since the inflation differential between Ireland and Germany has been almost 4 
percentage points, the inflation differential alone would have motivated a 6-8 percentage point 
interest rate differential between the two countries.  If we would take account of the output 
gap (which is hard to measure) we would get an even bigger difference.  A recent application 
of the Taylor rule made by economists at the Swiss Banking Group UBS suggested that 
Ireland should have had an interest rate of 6-7 percent while Germany basically needed a zero 
interest rate (Sunday Telegraph 24 August 2003). 
Is it meaningful to apply the Taylor rule to countries within a monetary union?  
Well, Germany is still Germany and Ireland is still Ireland even if they use the same currency.  
We may look at inflation, unemployment and growth in these countries and ask 
approximately what interest rate would have been set under a floating exchange rate.  
Admittedly, this is a very hypothetical exercise, but it does give us some indication of just 
how wrong the common interest rate is for these countries.  The answer is that it is very 
wrong.  
 
6.  Fiscal Policy, Labour Mobility, and Product Market Integration 
When the suitability of Europe as a currency area is discussed, comparisons are often made 
with the United States.  Two differences have typically been highlighted: fiscal federalism 
and labour mobility.  Recent discussions have put more focus on product market integration.  
How important are these three factors and the differences between the US and Europe? 
 
Fiscal Federalism:  
The federal budget is much larger in the U. S. than in the European Union and federal taxes 
imply an automatic redistribution between growing and contracting states, which does not 
exist in Europe.  Sala-i-Martin and Sachs (1992) and Bayoumi and Masson (1995) found that   22
the federal budget offsets 30-40 percent of income changes in individual US states.  On the 
other hand, most European states have relatively large public sectors and high taxes compared 
to the U. S. and therefore the automatic stabilizers are typically stronger in Europe than in the 
U. S.  Unless we believe in complete Ricardian equivalence, fiscal policy could, in theory, 
perform a similar stabilizing role as the federal budget does in the United States.   
On the other hand, fiscal stabilisation of “shocks” is not always desirable.  One 
purpose of a pension reform would be to increase the national savings rate and this 
necessarily translates to a decrease in domestic demand.  If investment opportunities improve, 
it does make sense to exploit them, and to finance some of the new investment by borrowing 
abroad.   
Even if stabilisation is desirable, and fiscal policy can do the job much of the 
time, there are likely to be periods when fiscal policy is not very successful, and sometimes 
fiscal policy is a source of shocks because changes in the fiscal stance are motivated by 
politics rather than economics.  Maybe there existed some feasible fiscal policies for Ireland 
and Germany, which, if pursued, had helped them to avoid the current imbalances.  Did the 
governments in Ireland and Germany pursue those policies?  Obviously, the answer is no. 
  In the case of Germany, the problems with the stability pact must be seen in the 
context of general macroeconomic developments.  A consequence of large welfare states and 
automatic stabilizers is that government deficits are quite cyclical in the European countries.  
A recession implies lower tax revenues and much of the cost of rising unemployment falls on 
the government.  Whether such deterioration is desirable is less clear.  If government finances 
are in order, swings in the deficit are not a problem but help to stabilise the economy.  But 
when government finances are weak, increasing deficits may create uncertainty about the 
sustainability of government finances and this may have negative effects on consumption and 
investment.  Giavazzi and Pagano (1990, 1996) argue that in such situations, fiscal policy 
may even have the opposite effect to what it has in conventional Keynesian models.  The 
effect of fiscal policy is hard to judge in a specific situation, but what does seem clear is that 
fiscal policy is an unreliable tool when government finances are already weak. 
The stability pact is often criticized for putting to harsh constraints on fiscal 
policy.  It should be remembered, however, that the stability pact was not intended as a day-  23
by-day regulation of fiscal policies in the member countries of the EMU.  The philosophy in 
the Maastricht Treaty was that the member countries would be capable of pursuing suitable 
fiscal policies for their countries.  The rules concerning deficits and debt levels were only 
intended as minimum requirements preventing serious mismanagement of government 
finances.  The fact that so many countries have ended up being constantly constrained by 
these rules shows that the view taken in Maastricht was too optimistic. Fiscal policy is not 
always managed in the best way and it does not always suffice to stabilise the economy.   
 
The Labour Market 
In their classical study of regional adjustments in the US, Blanchard and Katz (1992) showed 
that much of the adjustment to job losses in U. S. states takes the form of workers moving 
between states.  Labour mobility is much smaller between European countries so an important 
adjustment mechanism is lacking in Europe.  A less well-known result in the study by 
Blanchard-Katz is that very little of the adjustment to regional shocks occurs via wages.  
Wages do not fall much in depressed states.  A plausible interpretation is that the U. S. labour 
market is reasonably well integrated so that firms must pay similar wages to keep their best 
workers.   
The situation in Europe is very different.  With almost no labour mobility 
between countries, wages can differ substantially, and there can be long periods during which 
wages rise faster in one country.  This difference between the US and Europe is illustrated in 
Figure 1, where the upper panel shows the distribution of US states with respect to total wage 
increases over the 1998-2002 period.  The figure shows that 11 states had a 15 percent wage 
increase, 9 states had a 14 percent wage increase and so on.  On the low side, Michigan had a 
10 percent wage increase and on the high side Massachusetts had a 20 percent wage increase.  
The lower panel shows the corresponding distribution for the euro area.  Germany and Italy 
had 9 percent wage increase over the period, while Ireland had a 28 percent wage increase, 
followed by Portugal with 21 percent. Greece (22 percent) is not included since they joined 
EMU later. The US and the euro area have similar size in terms of population.  The US is 
divided into 51 states and the euro area is divided into 12 countries.  If the economic 
structures were similar in the two areas, we would expect the averaging effect to bring wage   24
increases in European countries closer to each others compared to US states.  In fact, the 
difference between the highest and the lowest wage increase is twice as large for the euro 
area. 
An argument which has often been made in the Swedish discussion is that 
membership in the monetary union would imply a new discipline for wage setters.  Once we 
would join the monetary union, wage setters would realise that wages need to rise “in pace 
with Europe”.  There are two problems with this argument.  First, and as shown above, 
adjustments of relative wage and price levels are necessary and for this reason wage increases 
“in pace with Europe” is not a sustainable norm in a monetary union.  Such a norm may work 
for a while, but it is likely to break down when a big asymmetric shock occurs.  Second, 
evidence on “inflation persistence” in the Phillips curve suggests that wage and price setters 
are relatively backward looking and hence they are unlikely to take account of potential future 
cost crises.  An overheated labour market leads to wage increases as firms bid for workers 
independent of its long run consequences and warnings by the government.   
 
Product Market Integration 
In his paper “The Purchasing Power Parity Puzzle” Rogoff (1996) concluded that:  
“International goods markets are highly integrated, but not nearly as integrated as 
domestic goods markets.  This is not an entirely comfortable conclusion, but for now there 
is no really satisfactory alternative explanation of the purchasing power parity puzzle.”    
My analysis is completely different.  Imperfect competition in product markets is a key 
element in the model, but no claim has been made that international markets are 
fundamentally different from domestic markets.  Products are differentiated and customer 
relations are important in the home market too.  But prices of German cars are likely to be 
more closely correlated than the prices of Volvos and BMWs because German car makers 
have to pay similar wages to their workers.
25    
 
                                                 
25 For example, Engel and Rogers (1996) examine disaggregated consumer price indices for cities in the US and 
Canada.  They show that relative price levels between cities in the same country vary much less than relative 
prices between cities situated in different countries.   25
7.  Conclusion 
The model presented here is clearly stylised.  By allowing the central bank to respond to all 
shocks it gives an exaggerated picture of the potency of monetary policy outside the monetary 
union.  But the qualitative conclusions are likely to be robust theoretically and the model is 
consistent with a number of basic macroeconomic facts such as the persistence of movements 
in output and consumption, large and persistent movements in real and nominal exchange 
rates, close correlation between real and nominal exchange rates, lack of predictability of the 
exchange rate except in the long run, and inflation persistence.  Since a model with imperfect 
competition fits these facts much better than models with perfect competition and PPP (or 
only small deviations from PPP) it seems more relevant to use for policy analysis. 
The main new insight, drawing on work by Honohan and Lane (2003), is that 
the problems caused by asymmetric shocks are worse than we foresaw before EMU started.  
In studies such as Calmfors et. al. (1997), the main focus of the analysis was on the risk of 
shocks and how to stabilise demand shocks at some given sticky price.  What we failed to 
foresee was the consequences when asymmetric shocks are not stabilised: inflation 
differentials that magnify the imbalances.   
Key ingredients in the analysis are lack of labour market integration, so wages 
can differ substantially between countries, imperfect competition in goods markets, making 
relative price adjustments necessary, and persistent supply and demand shocks.  High 
persistence of shocks is plausible, consistent with the facts, helps to resolve the uncovered 
interest parity puzzle for floating exchange rates, and leads to persistent imbalances inside the 
monetary union. 
One money does not make one perfect market - but one money works better if 
there is already one labour market.  In the absence of a high degree of labour market 
integration, the common interest rate may lead to boom-bust cycles in the member countries.  
There is no such thing as a perfect exchange rate system.  Confidence shocks are a 
conundrum under floating exchange rates.  Undeniably, there is noise in exchange rates; but a 
floating exchange rate and a clear inflation target may still be a powerful pair that maintains 
macroeconomic balance. 
   26
 
References 
Akerlof, G. A., Dickens, W. T., and Perry, G. L., 1996, The macroeconomics of low inflation. 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1, 1—59 
Alexius, Annika, 2001, Uncovered Interest Parity Revisited, Review of International 
Economics 9, 505-517. 
- “ – and Johnny Nilsson, 2000, Real exchange Rates and fundamentals: Evidence from 15 
OECD Countries, Open Economies Review 11, 383-397. 
Alexius, Annika, 2002, Can Endogenous Monetary Policy Explain the Deviations from UIP?, 
Working Paper 2002:17, Department of Economics, Uppsala University. 
Ball, Lawrence, 2000, Near-Rationality and Inflation in Two Monetary Regimes, Working 
Paper 7988, National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Ball, Lawrence, 1999, Policy rules for Open Economies, in John Taylor (ed.) Monetary Policy 
Rules, University of Chicago Press. 
Bayoumi, T. and P. Masson, 1995, Fiscal Flows in the United States and Canada: Lessons for 
Monetary union in Europe, European Economic Review 39. 
Bergvall, Anders, 2002a, The Stabilizing Properties of Floating Exchange Rates: Some 
International Evidence, Working Paper 2002:14, Department of Economics, Uppsala 
University. 
  -  “  - , 2002b, What Determines Real Exchange Rates? The Nordic Countries. Working 
Paper 2002:15, Department of Economics, Uppsala University.  
Blanchard Olivier J., 1989, A Traditional Interpretation of Macroeconomic Fluctuations, 
American Economic Review 79, 1146-1164. 
Blanchard, Olivier J., and Lawrence F. Katz, 1992, Regional Evolutions, Brookings Papers 
on Economic Activity 1. 
Blinder, A. S., Canetti, E. D. Lebow, D. E. and Rudd, J. B. (1998).  Asking about prices - a 
new approach to understanding price stickiness,  New York, Russel Sage. 
Calmfors, Lars, Harry Flam, Nils Gottfries, Janne Haaland Matlary, Magnus Jerneck, Rutger 
Lindahl, Christina Nordh Berntsson, Ewa Rabinowicz, Anders Vredin, 1997,  EMU - A 
Swedish Perspective, Kluwer.   27
Calmfors, Lars and Åsa Johansson, 2002, Nominal wage Flexibility, Wage Indexation and 
Monetary Union, CESifo working paper 761. 
Christiano, L. J., Eichenbaum, M., and Evans, C. L. (1999). Monetary policy shocks: What 
have we learned and to what end? In M. Woodford and J. B. Taylor, editors, Handbook 
of Macroeconomics, Elsevier Science North-Holland, Amsterdam. 
Engel, Charles, and John H. Rogers, 1996, How wide is the border? American Economic 
Review 86, 1112-1125. 
Fama, Eugene, 1984, Forward and Spot Exchange Rates, Journal of Monetary Economics 14, 
319-38. 
Flam, Harry and Håkan Nordström, 2003, Trade Volume Effects of the Euro: Aggregate and 
Sector Estimates, manuscript, Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm 
University. 
Froot, K. A. and Klemperer, P. D., 1989, Exchange Rate Pass-Through when Market Share 
Matters, American Economic Review 79, 637-54. 
Gaynor, Kevin, Holger Fahrinkrug, Edward Stansfield, Stephane Deo, Edward Teather, Caroll 
Sutcliffe, 2002, The Year Ahead in Europe, December 2003, UBS Warburg. 
Giavazzi, Francesco and Marco Pagano, 1990, Can Severe Fiscal Adjustments be 
Expansionary? NBER Macroeconomics Annual 5, MIT Press, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts. 
Giavazzi, Francesco and Marco Pagano, 1996, Non-Keynesian Effects of Fiscal Policy 
Changes: International Evidence and the Swedish experience, Swedish Economic Policy 
Review 3, 67-103. 
Goldstein, M. and M. Kahn, 1985, Income and Price Effects in Foreign Trade.  In R. Jones 
and P. Kenen (eds.) Handbook of International Economics, Elsevier, Amsterdam. 
Gottfries, Nils, 1986, Price Dynamics of Exporting and Import Competing Firms, 
Scandinavian Journal of  Economics, 88, 417-436. 
- “ - , 2002, Market Shares, Financial Constraints, and Pricing Behaviour in the Export 
Industry, Economica 69, 583-607.  
- “ -, 2003, Interest Rate and Exchange Rate inside and Outside EMU, Ekonomisk Debatt 31, 
May 2003 (in Swedish).   28
Holden, Steinar, 1994,  Wage bargaining and nominal rigidities. European Economic Review, 
38, 1021—1039. 
Holden, Steinar, 2003, The costs of price stability–downward nominal wage rigidity in 
Europe, Manuscript, University of Oslo, forthcoming in Economica 
Honohan, Patrick and Philip R. Lane, 2003, Divergent Inflation Rates in EMU, Economic 
Policy 37, 357-394. 
Klemperer, Paul, 1995, Competition when Consumers have Switching Costs: An Overview 
with Applications to Industrial organization, Macroeconomics, and International Trade, 
Review of Economic Studies 62, 515-539. 
Lundin, Magnus, 2003, The Dynamic Behaviour of Prices and Investment: Financial 
Constraints and Customer Markets, Ph D Thesis, Uppsala University. 
Mankiw, N Gregory, 2001, The Inexorable and Mysterious Tradeoff Between Inflation and 
Unemployment, Economic Journal 111, C45-C61. 
Mankiw, N. Gregory and Ricardo Reis, 2002, Sticky Information Versus Sticky Prices: A 
Proposal to Replace the New Keynesian Phillips Curve, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 1295-1328. 
McCallum, Bennet T., 1994, A Reconsideration of the Uncovered Interest Parity 
Relationship, Journal of Monetary Economics 33, 105-132. 
Micco, Alejandro, Ernesto Stein and Guillermo Ordonez, 2003, The Currency Union Effect 
on Trade: Early Evidence from EMU, Economic Policy 37, 317-356. 
Meredith, Guy and Menzie Chinn, 1998, Long-Horizon Uncovered Interest Parity, NBER 
Working Paper 6797. 
Meese, R. and Kenneth Rogoff, 1983, Empirical Exchange Rate Models of the Seventies: Do 
they Fit Out of Sample? Journal of International Economics 14, 3-24. 
Nyberg, Dan, 2003, Essays on Exchange Rate Risk and Uncertainty, Ph D thesis, Stockholm 
University. 
Obstfeld, Maurice and Kenneth Rogoff, 2000, The Six Major Puzzles in International 
Macroeconomics: Is There a Common Cause? Macroeconomics Annual 15. 
Rogoff, Kenneth, 1996, The Purchasing Power Parity Puzzle, Journal of Economic 
Litterature 34, 647-668.   29
Romer, David, 2001, Advanced Macroeconomics, McGraw-Hill, Boston. 
Sala-I-Martin, X. and J. Sachs, 1992, Fiscal Federalism and optimal Currency Areas: 
Evidence for Europe from the United States, in Canzoneri (ed.) Establishing a Central 
Bank: Issues in Europe and Lessons from the U. S., Cambridge university Press, 
Cambridge. 
Sinn, Hans-Werner, 2003, The Laggard of Europe, CESifo Forum 4, Special Issue, Spring 
2003. 
UBS, 2003, The Year Ahead in Europe, Global Economic & Strategy Research, UBS 
Warburg, December 2003. 
Taylor, John B., 1993, Discretion Versus Rules in Practice, Carnegie Rochester Conference 
Series on Public Policy 39, 195-214.   
Sunday Telegraph, 2003, Europe on the Rates Rack, August 24.  
Svensson, Lars E. O., 1994, Fixed Exchange Rates as a Means to Price Stability: What have 
We Learned? European Economic Review 38, 447-468. 
Walters, Alan, Britain´s Economic Renaissance, Oxford University Press, Oxford.   30
 
Table 1.  Inflation  and interest rates inside and outside EMU.  
Averages 1999-2002. 
 














Euro Countries:   
Germany 2.1  0.8  1.4  3.7  2.9  2.3   
France 3.9 1.2 1.4  3.7  2.5 2.3   
Austria 2.6  1.2 1.8 3.7  2.5  1.9   
Belgium 2.5  1.5  1.9  3.7  2.2  1.8   
Finland 4.0  1.7  2.1 3.7  3.0  1.6  
Luxembourg 3.1  -  2.2  3.7  -  1.5   
Italy 2.3  2.3  2.4  3.7  1.4  1.3   
Netherlands 3.5  3.5  3.0  3.7  0.2  0.7   
Spain 3.2  3.7  3.1  3.7 0.0  0.6   
Portugal 4.5  4.0  3.3  3.7  -0.3  0.4  
Ireland 6.5 4.6 4.2 3.7  -0.9  -0.5   
Max-min 5.4  3.8  2.8  0.0  3.8  2.8   
              
Inflation targeting countries:    
Sweden 2.9  1.3  1.6 3.8  2.5  2.2  
New 
Zealand 
3.2 1.8 1.9  5.7  3.9 3.8   
Canada 2.1  1.9 2.3 4.3  2.4  2.0   
GBR 4.1  2.3  2.0  5.1  2.8  3.1   
Australia 3.7  2.7  3.3  5.2  2.5  1.9   
Max-min 2.0  1.4  1.7  1.9  1.5  1.9   
Notes:  Inflation and interest rates are averages for the period.  Source:  OECD Main 
Economic Indicators. 
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Table 2.  Ireland and Germany in the First Years of Monetary Union 
 
  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 1999-
2003 
Ireland:      
wage  growth  5.9 0.7 5.5 8.4 9.0 7.0 5.0 7.0
inflation  4.1 6.2 4.1 4.3 5.3 4.9 4.0 4.5
interest  rate    6.1 5.4 3.0 4.4 4.2 3.3 2.3 3.4
interest  -  inflation  2,0 -0,8 -1,1 0,1 -1.1 -1.6 -1.7 -1.1
GDP  growth  10.9 8.8 11.1 10.0 6.0 6.0 3.2 7.3
      
Germany:      
wage  growth  0.0 1.0 1.4 2.0 2.2 1.5 2.4 1.9
inflation  0.7 1.1 0.5  -0.3 1.4 1.6 0.8 0.8
interest  rate    3.2 3.5 3.0 4.4 4.2 3.3 2.3 3.4
interest  -  inflation  2.5 2.4 2.5 4.7 2.8 1.7 1.5 2.6
GDP  growth  1.4 2.0 2.0 2.9 0.6 0.2 0.3 1.2
 
Notes: Wage growth: percentage change in the wage rate of private/business sector.  Inflation: 
percentage change in GDP deflator, used to measure inflation from the point of view of 
producers.  Interest rate: short term.  Interest minus inflation measures the expected real 
interest rate if you expect the same inflation as last year.  Numbers for 2003 are OECD 
projections.  Source:  OECD Economic Outlook database.  The table is adapted from Gottfries 
(2003).   32
Figure 1.  The Disparity of Wage Increases in Europe Compared to US States 
 

































































Sources:  US: Average annual pay in the private sector from Bureau of Labor Statistics.  
Europe:  Hourly earnings from OECD, Main Economic Indicators.   33
Appendix.  Market Structure, Wages, Prices, Exports, and the Real Exchange Rate 
 
Wage and Price Setting and the Phillips Curve 
Product markets are characterized by monopolistic competition.  There is a large (fixed) 
number of firms indexed i.  Some firms produce nontradables and some produce for the 
export market.  To simplify, I assume that domestically produced tradables are not consumed 
at home.  The production function is the same for all firms: 
 
i i AN Y =       ( A 1 )  
 














− Φ = ϕ        ( A 2 )  
 
where Pi is the price charged by firm i.  The relevant market price,  m P , and market demand, 
D, are taken as exogenous by the individual firm.  To model wage setting, I use a simple 
efficiency wage model where turnover cost depends on the relative wage set by the firm and 
on the level of employment relative to the labour force:  ( ) ( ) i i N L N W W cW
δ σ / /
− .  Thus profit 
of firm i is written as: 
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i .  Using lower case letters to denote logs 
and allowing for the actual wage of the representative firm to depend on the expected wage 
level we get
26   
                                                 
26 Firm have correct information about employment but may have incorrect expectations about the wage level.  
This is a shortcut for a more elaborate model with explicitly predetermined wages.   34
 
() l − + + = n w w
e α α0      ( A 6 )  
 
where  () ( ) 1 / ln 0 + = σ σ α c  and  ( ) 1 / + = σ δ α , or, equivalently: 
 
() n n w w
e − + = α      ( A 7 )  
 
where n  is the natural level of employment:  α α / 0 − = l n .  In the market for nontradables, 

















































ln . (A9) 
 
Assuming, as above, that firms have correct expectations about technology and employment, 
but may have incorrect expectations about wages, we get  () n n w w p p
e e − = − = − α . Since 
n a y + =  we can write 
 
() y y p p
e − + = α      (A10) 
 
where  n a y + =  is the natural level of output. 
 
 
Exports, the Real Exchange Rate, and Aggregate Demand 
Exporting firms are assumed to be small in the foreign market and set the same price  
 








,     (A11) 
 
where  * EP  is the foreign price of tradable goods expressed in domestic currency.  For later 


















⎛ − Φ = ϕ ,     (A12) 
   35
where Y* depends on the number of exporting firms and world demand, both of which are 







− = Ε .  Using (A8) we can 




























,   (A13) 
 
where  P EP Q / * = .  Let Z denote the nominal value of domestic spending and assume that 
consumers have Cobb-Douglas preferences between nontradables and tradables and spend a 




















λ .     (A14) 
 










































β .     (A15) 
 
Assuming that real spending Z/P is a function of a demand shock and the expected real 
interest rate and taking a log linear approximation, we get the IS curve in the text. 